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Economic policy is too important NOT to be left to professional economists. This is so clear
in Argentina nowadays, that no presidential candidate for the 1999 election, has picked up as his
minister of economics, someone who do not have intensive training in "modern" economic
analysis.
This has been so since mid 1980's, and it has been increasingly so since the beginning of the
1960's.
This paper describes the history of the relationship between professional economists and
economic policy in Argentina: as analyzers and forecasters, designers and implementers (one
natural extension would answer the following question: where these professional economists got
the inspiration from: their professors, the "schools" of the time?).
"Massive" modern professional training in economics is roughly four decades old in
Argentina, as a result of the fact that "since 1957-59 US universities like Harvard, Chicago, Yale,
Columbia, MIT, Texas, etc., began receiving argentine students of economics in their graduate
programs" (Dagnino Pastore and Fernandez López, 1988)
*1, and public and newly founded private
universities separated studies in economics from accountancy
2.
I'm not saying that before the end of the 1950's there was no talent in charge of economic
policy. Juan J. Romero and Carlos Pellegrini on debt restructuring during the 1890's, Federico
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A conversation with Alfredo J. Canavese, before writing this paper, was very helpful... and enjoyable.
Domingo F. Cavallo and Adolfo C. Díz also provided valuable information. Aldo A. Arnaudo, Javier Cardozo, Adolfo
C. Díz, Víctor J. Elías, Daniel Heymann, Jorge M. Katz, Juan J. Llach, Martín Lagos, Luisa Montuschi, Julio J.
Nogués, Armando P. Ribas, made valuable comments on the preliminary draft. Am I the only responsible of the
remaining errors?
1 This paper brilliantly synthetize the history of the professional economist in government in Argentina.
2 Before 1958 it was necessary to graduate as Public Accountant, to be able to study economics and become a Doctor in
Economic Science (heretoafter “old” DES).2
Pinedo and Raúl Prebisch on handling the impact of the Great Depression during the 1930's,
Prebisch on the reconstructing of the argentine economy after the overthrown of Juan Domingo
Perón in 1955 (Prebisch, 1955 and 1956)
3, are excellent examples of the use of "sound economics"
for solving problems, without exposure to formal "modern" economic analysis
4. But I want to
restrict the scope of this paper to professional economists's interaction with economic policy.
This story will probably surprise nobody. In Argentina professional economists interaction
with economic policy started through modeling issues and performing short run economic analysis,
followed by designing tools and working in economic teams in non crucial roles, and eventually
taking themselves the responsibility of design and implementation of economic policy.
1. MODELING ISSUES AND SHORT RUN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
Professional economists initial interest in current economic policy implied modeling issues
and performing short run economic analysis. Both tasks took place outside economic teams, in the
department of economics at the universities, in research centers financed by the private sector, etc.
1.1 Issues
The following survey presents pioneer professional modeling inspired by current economic
events.
1) Non monetary theory of inflation. The huge price increase of the first semester of 1959
(80%, at wholesale prices), despite restrictive monetary policy (money grew 22% during the same
period), inspired Olivera (1960) to model a "non monetary theory of inflation", which lead to a
series of papers on passive money
and structural inflation -i.e.: the increase of the overall price level as a consequence of a change in
relative prices, in the presence of downward inflexibility of absolute prices- (Olivera 1964, 1967a,
1968 and 1972).
2) Recessionary devaluation. Contrary to then conventional wisdom, i.e.: devaluations that
improve the trade balance also increase GDP, the 1959 and 1962 argentine devaluations were
followed by recessions. Diaz Alejandro (1965), Sidrauski (1968) and Belozercovsky (1970)
explained the recession that followed the mentioned devaluations, on income redistribution,
restrictive monetary policy and foreign currency denominated debt considerations, respectively.
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3) Olivera-Tanzi effect. Olivera (1967) modeled the increase in public sector deficit that
results from inflation, when public expenditure is related to the current price level, but public
revenues are related to the previous price level, as a result in lags in tax collections. Tanzi (1977)
showed the same result, that nowadays is known as the "Olivera-Tanzi effect".
Canavese and Heymann (1989, 1992) introduced the Olivera-Tanzi effect in simple models
of inflation with dual steady state solutions, showing that a singularity point may appear if the
fiscal deficit depends on the rate of inflation because of lags in tax collections. The finding has
relevant empirical implications, for instance the need for "antiinertial" measures, as well as definite
fiscal adjustment, for the success of antiinflationary programs like Austral (Argentina, mid 1985)
and Cruzado (Brazil, early 1986).
4) "Tablita cambiaria". The use of a preannounced rate of devaluation as an antiinflationary
tool, based on the monetary approach to the balance of payments, is one of those ideas generated in
the academic community  that  were applied almost immediately after invention
5. The proposal, the
contemporary analysis, and the ex-post explanations of what had happened, generated a huge
literature
6. Sacerdote (1978) proposed it 6 days before it was launched, Rodriguez (1979) modeled
it, Brodersohn and Duran (1979, 1980) and Pou and Rodriguez (1979) discussed how to measure
correctly international inflation during the Second Oil Shock, and Rodriguez and Sjaastad (1979)
showed the impact of tablita on the equilibrium exchange rate, to measure correctly "atraso
cambiario" (overvaluation of the local currency).
In Argentina tablita cambiaria ended in multiple maxidevaluations, recession and... more inflation.
The problems generated by the inconsistency among fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies,
were extensively discussed. Particularly important is Ribas (1980) attack on "monetarism",
pointing out that the real issue was then (and is now) the relative size of public expenditure, as
proportion of GDP, and not if public expenditure can be temporarily financed increasing real
interest rates, and generating a temporary capital inflow that appreciates the real exchange rate.
5) Employment effects and political economy of the opening of the economy. Nogues
(1981, 1982, 1988) showed that in Argentina there was no trade off between reducing trade barriers
and demand for labor, since the labor component of exports was larger than the labor component of
import substituting manufacturing production. This finding was important to neutralize one of the
fears of the opening of the economy, namely, its adverse impact on the labor markets. Rodriguez
(1981) modeled the direct relation between opening of the economy and real wages, as a result of
the mentioned increase in the demand for labor.
6) Incredible reforms. The same economic policy, particularly the same economic reform,
can produce very different effects on an economy, depending on the credibility of the population
about the permanence of the reform. This fact inspired Calvo (1986, 1987, 1988) to model
incredible reforms. For instance, if a Labor Flexibility Act is introduced, and entrepreneurs think
that the new legislation is going to stay "for many years" (nothing stays forever), they will hire new
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workers since it will be cheaper than before to fire them during the next recession; while if they
think that the reform will be quickly repudiated, because of the political impossibility to maintain
it, they will fire some of its employees as soon as possible, namely the opposite result.
7) Quasifiscal deficit. Fiscal deficit is equal to public expenditure minus public revenues. If
public expenditure and public revenues include "everything", then fiscal deficit measures the total
impact of the public sector on the economy.
But if public expenditure is restricted to the non financial sector of the economy, i.e.:
excludes expenditures financed directly by the Central Bank, quasifiscal deficit should be added to
conventionally measured fiscal deficit to get a correct appreciation of the impact of the public
sector in the economy. Who should be credited for pointing out the importance of quasifiscal
deficit?
8) "Institutional" considerations. "The central message of this book is that for Argentina to
grow again important changes are needed in the economic relations with the rest of the world, in
the rules of the game of our domestic economic organization, and in the intensity and nature of
social policies" (Cavallo, 1984). This proposal to restore sustained growth went well beyond
Harrod-Domar, or neoclassical, recommendations, paying attention also to the elimination of price
distortions, facing problems of government's credibility and reputation, etc.; in other words,
emphasizing the implications of a change in the economic regime. Llach (1987) emphasized the
importance of honoring all type of "contracts" for the reconstruction of the economy.
. . .
Less related to immediate economic policy, but nonetheless very important for helping to
introduce economic reasoning into decision making, are worth mentioning:
1) The Ph. D. dissertations written by Guadagni (1965) on Pricing of electricity services,
Díz (1966) on Money demand and supply and the dynamics of inflation and Reca (1967) on Price
response in the agricultural sector;
2) the pioneer works of Miguel Balboa and Alberto Fracchia on national accounts;
3) the works of "single issue" economists like Katz (1967, 1968 and with Kosakoff, 1989)
on Patterns of industrialization and the Microeconomics of technological change, Elías (1967,
1992) on Growth accounting, Guissarri (1989) on Informal economy, Porto (1990) on Fiscal
federalism, Dieguez (1991, and with Llach and Petrecolla, 1990) on Social expenditure, and
Givogri (1993) on the Productivity of capital. Also the pioneer work of Cavallo (1988), in
collaboration with Yair Mundlak, on counterfactual economic history in Argentina, estimating the
loss of growth that resulted from distorting relative prices; and
4) the studies and conferences on the opening of the economy, deregulation, public
expenditure, privatization of public sector firms, etc., organized by Fundación de Investigaciones5
Económicas Latinoamericanas (FIEL) and Asociación de Bancos Argentinos (ADEBA) during the
1980's. ADEBA's annual award also encouraged professional economists to work on these areas.
1.2 Short run economic analysis
In addition to papers and books on specific issues, at the beginning of the 1960's
professional economists began analyzing the performance of the argentine economic from the short
run perspective.
Instituto de Desarrollo Económico y Social (IDES), on a quarterly basis since the end of
1964; FIEL, on a monthly basis since 1965; and Fundación Mediterránea (FM) on a monthly basis
since 1978, issued reports on the short run performance of the economy (FIEL and FM still do it).
     There were also individual efforts, referred to specific economic programs and to the post II
World War disappointing performance of the argentine economy (in both cases, authors are ordered
according to the date of their first published work).
On specific economic programs, like the Krieger Vasena, Gelbard, and Mart!nez de Hoz
economic policies, the pioneer works of de Pablo (1972, 1974, 1979, 1979a, 1980, 1980a, 1980b,
1986, 1987, 1989, 1994, 1995), Arnaudo (1975, 1977a), Canitrot (1978, 1980, 1981), Ferrer (1979)
Fern ndez (1982), and Di Tella (1983) ought to be mentioned; on the poor performance of the
argentine economy the early contributions are those of Ferrer (1963, 1979a), Braun and Joy (1968),
Brodersohn (1969, 1974), Mallon y Sourrouille (1973), Arnaudo (1977, 1986) and Di Tella (1982).
Di Tella and Zymelman, with the collaboration of Petrecolla (1967), analyzed the performance of
the economy from 1876 to 1952.      Particularly at the beginning, these analysis were verbal -in the
sense of non mathematic, non econometric- and generally critical (authorities were accused of
following "monetarist" policies, ignoring keynesian or "structuralists" proposals)
7. Except in the
case of de Pablo, analysis showed little empathy with the decision making process that the
authorities were facing, in particular with institutional and political restrictions. The analysis of the
performance of the economy concentrated on the stop and go nature of economic policy.
. . .
Applied econometrics meant fitting individual macroeconomic functions like the
consumption, investment and import functions, and estimating simple econometric models, but the
dream of forecasting based on "an econometric model of the argentine economy" proved
unfeasible. Input-output tables were available a decade after the census on which they were
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computed, and accordingly were useless in those years of significant inflation and structural
changes.
. . .
Since the 1980s' most applied professional economists -many of them working as
consultants- debated in newspapers. Roberto T. Alemann, Daniel Artana, Miguel Angel Manuel
Broda, Juan Luis Bour, Domingo F. Cavallo, Raúl E. Cuello, Martín Lagos, Ricardo López
Murphy, Carlos Melconián, Armando P. Ribas, Rodolfo Santángelo, Adolfo Sturzenegger,
Federido Sturzenegger and Enrique Szewach, are among the most frequent contributors to the
debate.
2. DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING ECONOMIC POLICY
Describing, analyzing and criticizing economic policy without participating in economic
teams was a temporary job for professional economists. Because, not surprinsingly, some of them
eventually became involve with designing tools and participating personally leading economic
teams.
2.1 Tools
Argentine economists claim to have invented the following tools of economic policy
(invention does not mean starting from scratch, been 100% original. Bob Lucas did not "invent"
rational expectations, nevertheless the Nobel Committee was correct in prizing his contributions to
macroeconomic analysis).
1) Crawling peg. Contrary to Williamson's (1981) assertion, that frequent devaluations pari-
passu with the difference between domestic and international inflation was invented in Chile in
1965
8, the method was applied in Argentina since April 1964. "It was an argentine innovation"
(Garcia Vazquez, 1994), "a profound innovation" (Di Tella, 1982) "that shocked the IMF"
(Elizalde, 1980). The credit presumably corresponds to Félix Elizalde, president of the Central
Bank.
2) Monetary Regulation Account. The designers of the financial reform launched on June 1,
1977, found that in order to maintain the relation between monetary base and money that existed
before reform, to avoid a once and for all increase in money supply, reserve requirement should be
45% of deposits. Which meant that -even ignoring banking administrative costs and profits- active
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interest rates should almost double passive rates, a spread high enough to channel financial activity
through the informal financial markets, domestic and foreign. Just the opposite of what was aimed,
namely, the reduction -and, if possible, elimination- of the informal segments of the financial
markets, that had evolve as a result of regulations.
To solve the problem "Cuenta Regulación Monetaria" was created. Each financial
institution paid to the Central Bank a cargo rate for the loans financed with demand deposits (which
were allowed but did not pay interest), and received from the Central Bank a compensation rate for
the portion of the time deposits that they were forced to maintain as reserves. The credit
corresponds to Adolfo C. D!z and Ricardo Arriazu, president and main adviser of the Central Bank
respectively.
3) "Circular 1050". To index deposits and loans through financial indicators (for instance:
interest rates), on April 1, 1980, the Central Bank issued Circular RF 1.050, that interpreted interest
rates as percentual variations of an index, allowing the computation of the corresponding index.
The proposal was very useful since it became possible to compute a daily index with practically no
lag (indexes based on prices of goods and services had a two months lag, very inadequate in the
presence of high and highly fluctuating rate of inflation). The credit corresponds to Aldo Dadone
and Armando P. Ribas (1981)
9.
4) "Desagio". Contracts denominated in nominal values include the rate of inflation
expected during the time horizon of the contract. A sudden and unexpected elimination of inflation
turns nominal increases into real ones. For instance, a 30 day time deposit of $ 1, made when the
expected rate of inflation, and the nominal rate of interest, are 30% per month, will mean that 30
days later the bank will pay $ 1,30, just enough to maintain the purchasing power of the deposit.
But if immediately after the deposit is done an antiinflationary program freeze prices, forcing the
bank to pay the depositor $ 1,30 will mean forcing it to pay 30% monthly real interest rate, which is
unfeasible, unjust and unexpected.
To solve the problem "tabla de desagio" was created, transforming nominal values from the
old to the new currency, depending on the date. For instance: if the 30% nominal interest rate
reflected a 30% rate of inflation, at maturity the depositor will receive new $ 1, resulting from the
multiplication of $ 1,30 of the old currency by 0,769, the corresponding factor from tabla de
desagio. The credit corresponds to Daniel Heymann (as Axel Leijonhufvud points out to those who
credit tabla de desagio to Leijonhufvud and Heymann).
2.2 Personal involvement
Tables 1 and 2 show the technical background of the ministers of economy and presidents
of the Central Bank since 1958.
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TABLE  1
                           ECONOMIC MINISTERS
      Days                          Technical
Minister From To  in background
Day Mo. Year Day Mo. Year  Office
Emilio D. del Carril 1 5 1958 24 6 1959 420 Lawyer
Alvaro C. Alsogaray 25 6 1959 25 4 1961 671 Engineer
Roberto T. Alemann 26 4 1961 12 1 1962 263 Foreign graduate studies
Carlos A. Coll Benegas 15 1 1962 25 3 1962 69 Old DES
Jorge H. Wehbe 26 3 1962 5 4 1962 11 Lawyer
Federico Pinedo 6 4 1962 25 4 1962 19 Lawyer
Alvaro C. Alsogaray 30 4 1962 9 12 1962 224 Engineer
Eustaquio Méndez Delfino 10 12 1962 13 5 1963 155 Lawyer
José A. Martínez de Hoz 21 5 1963 11 10 1963 144 Lawyer
Eugenio A. Blanco 12 10 1963 5 8 1964 299 Old DES
Juan C. Pugliese 19 8 1964 27 6 1966 677 Lawyer
Jorge N. Salimei 29 6 1966 2 1 1967 188 Old DES
Adalbert Krieger Vasena 3 1 1967 10 6 1969 890 Old DES
José M. Dagnino Pastore 11 6 1969 17 6 1970 373 Ph' D
Carlos M. Moyano Llerena 18 6 1970 15 10 1970 120 Foreign graduate studies
Aldo Ferrer 26 10 1970 28 5 1971 215 Old DES
Juan A. F. Quilici 1 6 1971 10 10 1971 132
Cayetano A. Licciardo 11 10 1971 12 10 1972 367 Public accountant
Jorge H. Wehbe 13 10 1972 24 5 1973 224 Lawyer
José B. Gelbard 25 5 1973 20 10 1974 514 Entrepreneur
Alfredo Gómez Morales 21 10 1974 1 6 1975 224 Old DES
Celestino Rodrigo 2 6 1975 19 7 1975 48 Engineer
Pedro J. Bonanni 22 7 1975 11 8 1975 21 Old DES
Antonio F. Cafiero 14 8 1975 2 2 1976 173 Old DES
Emilio Mondelli 3 2 1976 23 3 1976 50 Old DES
José A. Martínez de Hoz 29 3 1976 28 3 1981 1826 Lawyer
Lorenzo J.Sigaut 29 3 1981 21 12 1981 268 Old DES
Roberto T. Alemann 22 12 1981 1 7 1982 192 Foreign graduate studies
José M. Dagnino Pastore 2 7 1982 24 7 1982 54 Ph' D
Jorge H. Wehbe 25 8 1982 9 12 1983 473 Lawyer
Bernardo Grinspun 10 12 1983 18 2 1985 437 Old DES
Juan V. Sourrouille 19 2 1985 31 3 1989 1502 Old DES
Juan C. Pugliese 1 4 1989 25 5 1989 55 Lawyer
Jesús Rodríguez 26 5 1989 8 7 1989 44 Lic. in Economics
Miguel Roig 9 7 1989 14 7 1989 6 Engineer
Néstor M. Rapanelli 15 7 1989 15 12 1989 153 Engineer
Antonio E. González 18 12 1989 28 1 1991 407 Public accountant
Domingo F. Cavallo 29 1 1991 26 7 1996 2006 Ph' D
Roque B. Fernández 27 7 1996 Ph' D9
TABLE  2
                            PRESIDENTS OF THE CENTRAL BANK
     Days                           Technical
President From  To in background
Day Mo. Year Day Mo. Year office
José Mazar Barnett 15 5 1958 31 7 1959 443 Entrepreneur
Eusebio Campos 3 8 1959 27 1 1960 178 Old DES
Eustaquio A. Méndez Delfino 28 1 1960 30 5 1962 853 Lawyer
Ricardo P. Pasman 31 5 1962 9 12 1962 193 Entrepreneur
Luis María Otero Monsegur 10 12 1962 16 10 1963 311 Lawyer
Félix Gilberto Elizalde 17 10 1963 29 6 1966 987 Old DES
Antonio Micele 30 6 1966 25 7 1966 26 Old DES
Felipe S. Tami 26 7 1966 2 11 1966 100 Master of arts
Antonio Micele 3 11 1966 14 12 1966 42 Old DES
Benedicto AARA Bianchi 15 12 1966 3 1 1967 20 Lawyer
Pedro Eduardo Real 4 1 1967 24 6 1969 903 Lawyer
Egidio Iannella 25 6 1969 25 10 1970 488 Public accountant
Daniel Fernández 26 10 1970 20 4 1971 177 Old DES
Ricardo Gruneisen 28 4 1971 23 8 1971 118 Lawyer
Carlos S. Brignone 24 8 1971 25 7 1972 337 Old DES
Jorge Bermúdez Emparanza 26 7 1972 28 5 1973 307 Lawyer
Alfredo Gómez Morales 29 5 1973 2 9 1974 462 Old DES
Hernán Aldabe 11 10 1974 29 10 1974 18 Lawyer
Ricardo A. Cairoli 30 10 1974 17 7 1975 261 Old DES
Emilio Mondelli 1 8 1975 3 2 1976 187 Lawyer
Eduardo A. Zalduendo 4 2 1976 24 3 1976 48 Foreign graduate studies
Adolfo César Diz 2 4 1976 31 3 1981 1825 Ph' D
Julio J.Gómez 1 4 1981 31 5 1981 61 Entrepreneur
Egidio Iannella 1 6 1981 1 7 1982 336 Public accountant
Domingo F. Cavallo 2 7 1982 26 7 1982 54 Ph' D
Julio González del Solar 27 7 1982 9 12 1983 471 Old DES
Enrique García Vázquez 10 10 1983 18 2 1985 437 Old DES
Alfredo Concepción 19 2 1985 25 8 1986 553 Public accountant
José Luis Machinea 26 8 1986 31 3 1989 979 Ph' D
Enrique García Vázquez 1 4 1989 8 7 1989 99 Old DES
Javier González Fraga 9 7 1989 23 11 1989 137 Lic. in Economics
Egidio Iannella 27 11 1989 19 12 1989 23 Public accountant
Rodolfo C. Rossi 20 12 1989 22 1 1990 33 Old DES
Enrique Folcini 23 1 1990 20 3 1990 57 Lic. in Economics
Antonio Erman González 21 3 1990 27 6 1990 99 Public accountant
Javier González Fraga 28 6 1990 28 1 1991 215 Lic. in Economics
Roque B. Fernández 31 1 1991 28 7 1996 2006 Ph' D
Pedro Pou 29 7 1996 Ph' D10
According to table 1, Jose Mar!a Dagnino Pastore (1969-1970) was the first minister of
economy of Argentina with maximum academic training in a US university. Domingo Cavallo
(1991-1996) and Roque Fern ndez (1996 on) also have a Ph' D. While according to table 2, five
presidents of the Central Bank -two of them also ministers of economy- have a Ph' D.: Adolfo D!z
(1976-1981), Domingo Cavallo (1982), José Luis Machinea (1986-1989), Roque Fernández (1991-
1996) and Pedro Pou (1996 on), while Felipe Tami (1966) has a Master of Arts degree
10.
During the same period Argentina had 33 presidents of the Central Bank. In addition to the
5 Ph' D and 1 Master of Arts mentioned, 10 were Old DES, 8 lawyers, 3 public accountants, 3
entrepreneurs, 2 licenciados in economics and 1 had some formal training abroad.
This reading of tables 1 and 2 underestimate the participation of professional economists in
economic teams. On the one hand, because Roberto Alemann and Carlos Moyano Llerena also had
some formal training abroad; on the other hand, because ministers like Adalbert Krieger Vasena,
Antonio Cafiero and Juan Sourrouille, led teams with many professional economists.
The leadership, courage, toughness, etc., of ministers of economy and presidents of the
Central Bank are crucial, but the contribution of its main collaborators should not be
underestimated. An incredible amount of time and energy of the minister is "wasted" in
accompanying the president to protocolar meetings, neutralizing pressures, taking to the press, etc.;
preparing legislation, implementing decisions, etc., is most of the time in the hands of




How significant was the impact of professional economists on economic policy? There it no
single answer to this question. The following response concentrates on specific episodes.
1) Freeing of interest rates and deregulation of financial activity. Financial reform launched
on June 1, 1977, freed interest rates and allowed banks to do anything that was not specifically
prohibited. Systematically recommended by Armando P. Ribas since the beginning of the
seventies, it was introduced during the Mart!nez de Hoz period, by president of Central Bank Díz.
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Old "Doctors in Economic Science", 6 lawyers, 4 engineers, 2 public accountants, 2 had some formal training abroad, 1
licenciado in economics and 1 entrepreneur. And Quilici?.
11 Martínez de Hoz (1981, 1991) explained his version of his ministry in great detail (the only case, to the best of my
knowledge). De Pablo (1980a, 1986) interviewed former ministers of economy about their job. Di Tella and Rodríguez
Braun (1990) got the written version of ministers of economy between 1946 and 1983, while the September 1994 issue
of Valores published the testimony of presidents of the Central Bank from the seventies in Universidad Católica
Argentina.11
2) Liquification of liabilities. The increase of the real value of firm liabilities, resulting from
very high real interest rates (say: 2% per month), increased the risk of massive bankruptcies in the
private sector. Since July 1, 1982, nominal interest rates were pegged well below the rate of
inflation, to reduce the real value of liabilities. It was introduced during the Dagnino Pastore period,
by president of the Central Bank Cavallo (Cavallo, 1981, 1982)
12.
3) Austral Plan. In mid 1985 the rate of inflation was approaching 1% per day, and
increasing; and that was considered too much... even in Argentina. So the time for "social demand
for action" had arrived.
On June 14, 1985 Austral plan was launched, combining orthodox and heterodox measures.
The latter included fixing the exchange rate, public utility rates, wages, prices and interest rates (so
called "anchors"), and introducing "tabla de desagio"; the former included temporary measures to
increase fiscal revenues. Austral Plan was temporarily very successful, inflation resuming one year
later (Israel launched a very similar plan at the beginning of July 1985, that lasted much more
because of better orthodox component). It was introduced during the Sourrouille period.
4) Convertibility Plan. At the beginning of 1991, when the third hyperinflation was starting,
Argentina was heading to the use of a single currency: the US dollar.
On April 1, 1991 Convertibility Plan was launched, pegging the exchange rate "1 to 1" to
the US dollar, and making the peso fully convertible. Credibility on Convertibility was based on the
obligation of the Central Bank to maintain permanently enough foreign reserves to buy 100% of the
monetary base. Convertibility Plan had immediate success, but contrary to previous antiinflationary
programs, its success continues more than 8 years later, and more than 2 years after the minister
that introduced it (Cavallo) left office.
Like any successful program, Convertibility Plan has now many "fathers". Lagos (1989)
anticipated the need of Convertibility, as the "only road to restoring confidence on the local
currency" (my italics). Anyhow Cavallo's merit is overwhelming.
3. CONTRIBUTIONS TO ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
In addition to interaction with economic policy, argentine professional economists have
contributed to the stock of economic analysis.
                                                       
12 Bonex Plan, introduced at the end of 1989, was also inspired on the impossibility of honoring contracts as originally
stipulated, but in this case the problem was generated on the deposit side of the balance sheet (7 day time deposits,
denominated in pesos, were unilaterally transformed in dollar denominated bonds, with 10 years maturity, that could be
sold in the secondary market, initially with a 73% discount, later with practically zero discount). It was introduced
during the Gonzalez period, being suggested by Roque Fern ndez, then vicepresident of the Central Bank.12
Linear programming. Barral Souto (1941) presentation of Ricardo's theory of the division of
labor, is a pioneer exposition of what was later called linear programming. In 1961 the paper was
published in the International economic papers, a journal devoted to the publication in English of
"classic" monographs originally published in other languages. But it was not enough to impress the
Nobel committee, that in 1975 gave the award to Leonid Kantorovich and Tjalling Koopmans
(Dantzig could also complain, I presume).
Passive money and "structural inflation" (already referred).
Money and growth. Sidrauski introduced money in neoclassical growth models, writing a
couple of "classic" papers on the subject (Sidrauski 1967, 1967a).
Time inconsistency and incredible reforms. Calvo introduced realism in economic policy
modeling, showing the implications of time inconsistency (Calvo, 1978) and the already referred
works on incredible reforms.
Computational issues in general equilibrium models. Mantel's doctoral dissertation was
dedicated to improve the proof of the existence of competitive general equilibrium. In addition to
that "Mantel (1974) proved Sonnenschein's conjecture in the case of continuously differentiable
demand functions", says Debreu (1984) in his Nobel conference. To my knowledge, Rolf Mantel is
the only argentine  economist that has been mentioned in a Nobel conference
13.
Other. Rodolfo Manuelli on endogenous growth, and Julio Rotemberg on macroeconomics,
are other argentine economists that deserve mention in this survey.
4. A PERSONAL NOTE
This paper could have been written by any young student of economics patient enough to
read the monographs and books listed at the end; but it was written by a 55 years old "young"
economist who not only read them, but actually lived in Argentina while they were been inspired,
conceived, written, discussed and published. Interacting with the authors first as student and
research assistant, later as colleague and friend of all of them.
Among others, I could proudly say: "we did it". But that would probably be too much. More
appropriately it would be to say "we did it, without realizing that we were doing it".
                                                       
13 This paragraph does not do justice to Mantel's contribution. It is 100% my fault, due to
ignorance. I sent him the preliminary draft of the paper, hoping to improve this portion, but
unfortunately Rolf passed away at the beginning of February 1999. He deserves that someone, with
enough technical skills, summarizes his contribution to economic analysis.13
. . .
The story presented in this paper is a normal one. It would have been surprising that the first
argentine economist that got a Ph'D in a US university, on his return to Argentina would have gone
directly from the airport to the ministry of economics, to lead an economic team. The argentine
case shows some previous "homework", like understanding analyzing specific issues, engaging in
contemporaneous short run analysis, etc., and eventually getting major responsibilities on economic
policy.
It is a collective, spontaneous story. The works included in this paper show that no single
person, no single institution, could claim the bulk of professional interaction with economic
policy
14. This, again, is not surprising. Out of a common background multiple monographs
emerged through many years, and the neat presentation of this paper should not suggest the reader,
that the resulting body of knowledge emerged from a grandiose research plan that was established
from the very beginning.
It is also a rich story, its richness arising from the "raw material" generated during the
period in which occurred. During the second half of the XX century Argentina was a giant school
of economics, and what is a cost for the population is a source of inspiration for economists (I
definitely prefer to live in a country in which the front pages of the newspapers are boring, than in
another in which they are exciting). Economists who live in Switzerland had to imagine the effects
of maxidevaluations, the impact of inflationary shocks or balance of payments bottlenecks; in
Argentina it was just a question keeping the eyes open... and translating reality in the language of
professional economists.
It is a sad story as well, because most of the ingenuity displayed by professional economist
was dedicated to design second best tools, because the first best solution was considered unfeasible.
Indexing, liquefying, compensating for incredible high reserve requirements, are very good
examples of using talent to neutralize, but not eliminate, inflation, distortions, etc.
But at the same time is history. The hyperinflation of the first semester of 1989 (in July
1989 prices rose 4% per... day) was a watershed. As a result of opening of the economy,
privatization and deregulation, since the 1990's we live in a "normal" country, in the sense that our
agenda for research is very similar to the one existing in many other countries. Which means that
we can export, and import, talent, ideas, books, papers, courses, etc.
What is the role of the professional economist, in a "normal" country? For earning a living, I
see demand for our services in firms, government, education, the press, etc. From the "general
equilibrium point of view", I forecast a return to the perspective of the Founding Fathers. Neither
                                                       
14 Elias finds "specializations" among universities. La Plata concentrated on fiscal policy, Cordoba on public sector
firms (tariffs and privatization), Tucuman on empirical issues, Mendoza on regional economics, Buenos Aires on
stability.14
Smith, nor Ricardo or Malthus were worried about the rate of inflation of the next month, or the
variation of industrial production during the next quarter. They had systemic preoccupations, for
instance, where are we going?. Think of the worries about the Stationary State, and the
corresponding discussion about the Corn Laws. Today, the implications of the globalization of the
economy, and the volatility of international capital markets, would find a privileged position in the
agenda of the "Political economy club".
Professional economists have finally landed in economic policy, and for better or worse (for
better, in my opinion, despite the fact that sometimes, applying wrong economic analysis, we
generated some of the problems we eventually had to solve), they have landed to stay.15
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